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ABSTRACT
 
The continuing crisis at Volkswagen has attracted widespread attention and concern
in its seeming epitomisation of  the ‘sclerosis’ of  the German business system and
Germany’s system of  industrial relations in large firms. These wider, systemic ques-
tions are reviewed here as well as the key, related issue as to how far, under global-
isation, German corporate success can be achieved while retaining its long-established
 
approach towards social cohesion.
 
INTRODUCTION
 
For Chancellor Merkel and many in the German business class, the ongoing crisis at
Volkswagen (VW) epitomises a wider sclerosis suffered by the German business system
and within this its system of  industrial relations in large firms. VW’s Wolfsburg plant
is so overmanned that natural wastage must account for 5,000 redundancies per year
for the foreseeable future and VW’s largest shareholder—Lower Saxony—is frequently
charged with letting the workforce run the company to the extent that today manu-
facturing costs in the plant are 40 per cent greater than those of  VW’s competitors.
Further, even if  Wolfgang Bernhard, Head of  the VW brand, is successful in achieving
a 30 per cent reduction in labour costs by 2008, VW may well remain less productive
than its competitors. Beyond VW, the German government appears impotent in the
face of  deeper Europeanisation and is only capable of  limiting recession by breaching
EU Stability and Growth Pact conditions on annual public debt at 3 per cent of
national income and, even then, unemployment remains at 5 million and accumulated
public debt a massive 66 per cent of  GDP.
In reviewing developments in the German business system over the past year or so,
this article seeks to raise three issues for discussion. First, what does the crisis at VW
tell us about any wider crisis in the German business system and its attendant indus-
trial relations system? Second, how does the literature make sense of  what is going on
in the business system and industrial relations system? Third, what are the industrial
relations implications of  evidently divergent responses to pressures for movement
towards shareholder capitalism in the German economy? The key issue surrounding
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these three questions centres on the potential for a decoupling of  corporate success
and broader measures of  social cohesion in the German economy and under the
pressures of  globalisation.
 
CORRUPTION, OVERMANNING AND TRADING DOWN: CRISIS AT VW?
 
Created by Hitler in the 1930s, renewed and protected by the occupying powers under
the Marshall Plan and the European Recovery Programme, VW, like the social market
economy, epitomised postwar economic revival and sustained success in the German
business system. However, the early 1990s witnessed a major shock as globalisation
exposed VW’s comparatively high costs and overcapacity in production when renewed
competitive pressures from within and beyond the EU and the USA saw declining
sales of  VW group cars. In early 2006, VW announced plans to restructure the firm
in an effort to raise labour productivity, cut costs, reform workplace industrial rela-
tions and reduce overcapacity in production (Milne, 2006). In combination, these
strategies are designed to save 
 
€
 
7 billion and increase productivity by 30 per cent by
2010. With greater use of  common components across models, VW announced that
Toyota and not Mercedes would be the firm’s main competitor, wherein the aim is to
produce each model more cheaply than the previous one. Movement towards volume
production is in marked contrast to VW’s reaction to crisis in the 1970s, when in the
face of  emerging competition from Japanese producers, VW like other German car
producers did cut back on labour but moved production upmarket towards higher
value added, by improving design, quality and product range to focus on the European
market (O’Sullivan, 2000: 250–251; Streeck, 1989). As Streeck (1984) demonstrates,
VW was able to achieve these changes in large measure because of  its conservative
and cooperative works council. In addition to this, VW was able to rely on rural
migrants and guest workers who were prepared to accept whatever working conditions
were on offer to underpin their comparatively very high wage levels (Bardou 
 
et al.
 
,
1982: 247–249). In the contemporary period, none of  these options are available;
Japanese firms produce within the EU and EU enlargement rules out the large-scale
use of  guest workers focusing reform on change management, work reorganisation
and, even more so, workplace industrial relations.
Just how workplace reform is to be achieved was revealed in February this year.
Cost cutting and component part outsourcing are precluded by guaranteed contracts
that run until at least 2008; this, combined with a 2004 no compulsory redundancy
agreement that runs until 2011, forced the company back to an early-retirement
programme. Designed to reduce VW’s German labour force of  103,000 workers by
30,000, the details of  the deal not only reflect but also reinforce the so-called ‘VW law’
that protects the integrity of  German firms and in this case its exceptional pattern of
industrial relations. To qualify for retirement at 59 years, workers must be 55 years
old by 2009 and will receive a full salary until they are 62 years old when they receive
their pension; 20 per cent of  the pay package remains underwritten by government
subsidies.
The significance of  the VW case lies in what it tells us about the German business
and industrial relations system. The current crisis is apparently similar in scale and
scope to that experienced in the early 1970s when both the business system and the
industrial relations system were able to negotiate a pathway through the crisis. This
pathway marked the development of  diversified quality production to further embed
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stakeholder approaches to corporate governance and industrial relations in the Ger-
man business system. In the contemporary period, the question raised by the VW
crisis is threefold. First, if  VW can negotiate a way through, does this suggest that the
stakeholder approach to business and the Rhineland model of  industrial relations are
more resilient than advocates of  Anglo-American approaches suggest? Second, does
the change package at VW illustrate that codetermination and stakeholder approaches
can incorporate the requirements of  shareholder capitalism to usher in an enlightened
model of  shareholder capitalism into the German economy? Third, and related, will
this preclude the arrival of  and necessity for Anglo-American management techniques
in German-based firms? In short, does the VW case suggest change, continuity or
pathway adjustment?
 
STAKEHOLDER REFORM AND SHAREHOLDER CAPITALISM?
 
Discussion of  reform in German industrial relations is compounded by the fact that
Europeanisation and the European project within which Germany was central has
now diverged away from its postwar origins in the Marshall Plan, the Treaty of  Rome
and the Single European Act.
The way we look at things is greatly influenced by the models and embedded
approaches that prevail within national business systems. Reform of  the German
business system can only go towards shareholder capitalism, but at the same time this
movement is significantly influenced by Germany’s postwar stakeholder legacy.
 
The diffusion of shareholder capitalism
 
Following the demise of  Fordist approaches to volume production and the interna-
tional diffusion of  Japanese methods in the 1980s, a new growth regime premised on
the virtues of  enhancing shareholder value (SHV) became influential during the 1990s.
Shareholder capitalism refers to a phenomenon where American and British firms are
now seen to make dramatic and swift changes to their core strategies and associated
growth regimes in order to emphasise the priorities of  outside investors precisely
because financial institutions, institutional investors and private equity firms in par-
ticular are able to exert a strong influence over management action, if  not managerial
performance. Theoretically, if  shareholder capitalism and shareholder value represent
a restatement of  profit maximisation, shareholder capitalism and SHV should drive
allocative and organisational efficiency further forwards. However, empirically, where
national business systems are increasingly supported by the market, the imperative of
shareholder value may witness the focus of  corporate performance moving beyond
measures such as productivity, good working conditions and a balance between social
justice in the workplace and profitability.
The emergence of  SHV as a driver for management practice can be traced to the
crisis of  American capitalism in the early 1980s. The recovery from the collapse of
profits in the late 1970s and the aftermath of  the Iranian oil shock of  the early 1980s
led American economists and management theorists to argue that stalled economic
growth and declining productivity were not temporary but apparently permanent
shocks to the American business system (Hutton, 2002: 124). Economists and man-
agement theorists began to question and subsequently reject much of  the theoretical
and institutional underpinnings of  postwar economic success in the American
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business system. Economists rejected the utility of  managerial theories of  the firm that
emphasised managerial discretion and shareholder deference to professional salaried
managers (Bearle and Means, 1932; Chandler, 1977; Williamson, 1964; 1967). Empha-
sising instead relatively new agency theories (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and
Meckling, 1976) and transaction cost theories (Williamson, 1975), economists and
management theorists were joined by institutional investors and consultants who
began to focus not on the efficiency and organisational capability in American and
British variants of  managerial capitalism, but on its waste and inefficiency. Academic
debate over corporate governance in the American and British business systems now
appears resolved in favour of  shareholder capitalism wherein shareholders hold ulti-
mate control of  the firm with management (their agents), fulfilling their obligations
under company law by explicitly managing in the interests of  the shareholding class
to the exclusion of  other stakeholders (see Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001, where
this view is elaborated). Similarly, Rappaport (1998) argues that the creation of  eco-
nomic value for shareholders is the sole success criterion for corporate strategy.
Moreover, policy-wise this view is echoed in recent pronouncements by the OECD
that explicitly recognises the primacy of  shareholder interests (OECD, 2004).
The concentration on returns to shareholders disregards other stakeholders, in
particular workers and organised labour, to the extent that owner interests and those
of  senior management and employees are assumed to be the same. Intuitively manag-
ing for SHV is a threat to labour, particularly the often cited association between SHV,
downsizing and boosts to managerial remuneration. However, beyond the Anglo-
American paradigm, managing for shareholder value in a stakeholder system such as
the German one is not necessarily evident. For example, direct linkage between this
development and movement to ‘lower-road’ approaches to industrial relations sum-
marised as ‘hire and fire’, short-term contracts, less job security, poor training and
the potential threat of  outsourcing and offshoring may in fact be mediated by cultural
and institutional values embedded within the German system.
An example of  this is that, on the one hand, pro-business reform and the adoption
of  Anglo-American managerial practices for executives may strengthen the capability
of  German firms to stave off  hostile overseas takeovers within a more internationalised
market for corporate control. On the other hand, German firms have been adept in
their use of  external acquisitions on the financialisation model to satisfy the demands
of  institutional and family shareholders by deploying Anglo-American techniques
liable to significant institutional and political opposition in the domestic economy.
Indeed, the threat of  financialisation and an internationalised market for corporate
control appears as a lever by which German managers become more professional-
ised—less vocationally committed to a particular firm or sector—and lobby for the
reform of  their own remuneration packages on the Anglo-American model (see Carr,
2005). So while the market for corporate control and actors therein is diffused across
the German business system to generalise the operational rhetoric of  short-termism,
it is less clear that this will lead to the diffusion of  lower-road approaches to industrial
relations. In large measure this is the case because, in contrast to the UK, where a
focus on short-term profitability is the central index of  business performance, in
Germany a higher level of  institutional regulation has made it difficult for employers
to treat labour simply as a disposable commodity. Collective bargaining, codetermin-
ation and state legislation have resulted in high wages and restrictions on employers’
freedom to dismiss workers. This means that employers have had to achieve compet-
itiveness by ensuring that high wages are matched by high productivity and by com-
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peting on the basis of  product quality rather than price. This has meant placing a
relatively high emphasis on skill in the workforce and the production process.
 
The national embeddedness of stakeholder capitalism?
 
Within the German business system, firms operate a stakeholder model of  corporate
and organisational governance wherein management obligation is not only or even
primarily to shareholders but to the various needs of  a range of  stakeholders in the
company, including employees and, in larger firms, organised labour. This approach
to employment regulation is historically embedded and represents an integral part of
the German business system and its approach to organising and regulating economic
activity. Re-established during the allied occupation after the Second World War,
Germany’s system of  industrial relations contains a central principle of  collective self-
regulation by employer and employee organisations within a Constitutional frame-
work of  law and includes the following key characteristics. First, German employment
law establishes basic principles and institutional arrangements that allow employers
and workers to regulate their own affairs with little direct interference from the state.
More significantly, and more controversially as the VW case demonstrates for the
contemporary period, the law also provides for workers to be represented on the
supervisory boards of  firms employing more than 500 employees. Second, and related,
German employment law makes important distinctions between collective bargaining
and codetermination in terms of  their functions, institutions and the levels at which
they operate. Collective bargaining establishes basic terms of  employment such as
wages and hours; in contrast to this, codetermination deals with issues that arise from
the application of  industry-wide collective agreements in individual enterprises.
Traditionally, collective bargaining takes place at industry or sector level within
Germany’s 25 
 
Lande
 
 or local states, whereas codetermination is conducted between
works councils and management at workplace level. However, since the mid-1980s,
the role of  works councils in negotiating terms and conditions of  employment has
increased owing to the decentralising tendencies in German industrial relations and
the preferences of  some overseas multinational firms for workplace bargaining. More
recently, there has been growing criticism of  key features of  the German employment
system from many economic policy advisers and financial and business interests seeing
it as a hindrance to renewed economic growth, competitiveness and job creation.
Citing economic stagnation and unemployment over the last 10 years, these interests
became increasingly critical of  aspects of  the employment system in general, particu-
larly the level of  employment protection and social welfare benefits for workers and
the centralised system of  collective bargaining. These criticisms have developed into
demands for reforms to increase labour market flexibility (for more detailed discussion
of  the German system and its present difficulties, see Claydon and Clark, 2006; Frick
and Lehmann, 2005; Jacobi 
 
et al.
 
, 1998).
The criticism of  centralised collective bargaining is that it sets too high a minimum
wage, which together with the social welfare system prevents wages for unskilled
workers adjusting to a level that would lead to more job creation. It is also argued
that it prevents enterprises from addressing the need to develop more flexible ways of
using labour in order to raise productivity and reduce costs. The reforms that have
been demanded are that restrictions on the use of  flexible forms of  employment such
as temporary and fixed-term employment should be eased; the level of  social benefits
should be cut back to ease the tax burden on employers and enable wages to be more
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Journal compilation © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006
 
598 Ian Clark 
flexible at the lower end of  the market; and collective bargaining should be decent-
ralised to allow for greater wage flexibility and permit negotiation of  company work-
place ‘pacts’ on specific issues. However, as the VW case demonstrates, this is difficult
to negotiate and much of  Chancellor Merkel’s political rhetoric during last year’s
election campaign has been reined in and significantly moderated.
Pressures for labour market reforms along Anglo-American lines have been
reinforced by the growing influence of  the principles of  shareholder capitalism and
managing for shareholder value in the German business system. The diffusion of
multinational firms, the spread of  institutional investors and private equity firms and
the demands for greater financial transparency have led some analysts to build on the
seminal contribution of  O’Sullivan (2000) to argue that strong pressures are develop-
ing to force Germany to converge towards the Anglo-American model of  corporate
governance based on shareholder capitalism (see Gulger 
 
et al.
 
, 2004). Given the
incompatibility of  shareholder value with the existing stakeholder principle, its diffu-
sion among German companies could lead to the eventual abandonment of  the
German employment system and convergence towards a more hybrid mode (see
Pudelko, 2005).
 
Is reform of the German business system inevitable?
 
The answer lies in two words: accession and globalisation. For many years, the
German business system sustained competitive advantage in quality-diversified pro-
duction. Therein the components of  the German business system—skilled labour,
management concerned with innovation and technological development, integrative
and orderly labour relations, and long-term finance provided by local banks—com-
bined to produce value added, that is, cost plus products and services. The fall of  the
Berlin Wall witnessed the beginning of  the end. Saddled with major problems within
the economy, Chancellor Kohl levied a unification tax, which is still in place, and
launched a massive programme of  public works to modernise the infrastructure of
eastern Germany. Later in the 1990s, the German business system came under Anglo-
American pressures as new managerial techniques, summarised as performance man-
agement and variable pay combined with new managerial objectives focusing on
shareholder value, exposed the weaknesses of  the German business system (O’Sulli-
van, 2000). British, and more particularly American, multinationals located in Ger-
many appeared to be more efficient than many of  their German counterparts, not
because they necessarily were, but because they competed on the basis of  shareholder
capitalism not stakeholder capitalism, the characteristic, widely accepted feature of
postwar West Germany. German subsidiaries of  American and British multinationals
proved to be effective mechanisms for the diffusion of  new managerial techniques for
human resource management, performance management and variable pay for man-
agement grade employees, innovations that became increasingly attractive to indige-
nous firms in the early 21st century (Carr, 2005; Kurdlebusch, 2002).
 
THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IMPLICATIONS OF DIVERGENT 
RESPONSES TO PRESSURE FOR REFORM
 
For the German business system, coming to terms with the increasing international-
isation of  the Anglo-American model of  corporate governance involves the diffusion
of  several interrelated pressures for change. First, shareholder capitalism on the
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Anglo-American model requires standard financial reporting in order to garner the
support of  capital markets. Second, and directly related, the support of  capital markets
and central actors, such as pension funds and private equity firms, see merger and
acquisition activity as a source of  growth and shareholder value that may eclipse
longer-term organic growth and development. Third, shareholder capitalism broadly
defined has implications for organisational structures and patterns of  performance
management wherein cost plus models of  corporate strategy and related human
resources/industral relations strategies come under significant cost-reduction pres-
sures. For example, DaimlerChrysler recently announced a 
 
€
 
1 billion cost-cutting
programme that includes 6,000 HQ redundancies and a ‘trading-down’ relocation of
its HQ from the centre of  Stuttgart to a less expensive suburb. What remains unclear
is whether the 
 
€
 
1 billion will be reinvested in product development and engineering
or returned to shareholders.
The VW case also indicates that shareholder value pressures cannot be easily
accommodated where legislative safeguards over industrial relations prevail. Angela
Merkel, during the election campaign, suggested that two-thirds support from the
workforce should allow employers to bypass works council decisions. However, failure
to secure majority support from the electorate saw this suggestion shelved. Equally,
the comparatively insular pattern of  corporate governance enjoyed by German firms,
and VW in particular, means that a focus on shareholder interests is unlikely in the
foreseeable future. Examining German industrial relations through the lens of  shifting
coalitions within capital, management and labour reveals that although foreign inves-
tors bring with them pressure for shareholder value, reflecting globalisation, these
actors display divergent responses to these pressures which can be summarised under
three headings.
 
1. Towards enlightened shareholder value: codetermination and stakeholder 
corporate governance?
 
Adapting to the demands of  globalisation may mean just that—pathway adjustment
to incorporate a new pressure rather than a more forceful change to a new orientation.
As a paradigm example, the case of  VW demonstrates that the emergence of  share-
holder value strategies for capital and management has not undermined codetermin-
ation and collective bargaining as core institutions in the German business system.
However, as Jackson (2003) persuasively argues, although both are underpinned by
legislative fiat in the contemporary period, each may become subject to contractual
modification. Contractual modification describes the process of  decentralisation in
German industrial relations whereby sector-wide collective bargaining agreements are
increasingly subject to ‘opening clauses’ that entertain plant-level negotiation over
issues traditionally dealt with more centrally (Hassel, 1999). This is not a recent
phenomenon. Opening clauses have also morphed into employment pacts that pro-
mote pay concessions or changes to working time as responses to lacklustre consumer
demand and poor financial performance (Seifert and Massa-Wirth, 2005).
Competitive and financial pressures can therefore be mediated within existing insti-
tutional arrangements wherein the stakeholder dimension enables existing arrange-
ments to incorporate new developments. Hence, there is little evidence to show that
firms who are ushering in shareholder value seek to discontinue codetermination
(Jackson 
 
et al.
 
, 2005: 115–118). Furthermore, longitudinal studies demonstrate that
adoption of  Anglo-American management styles and an increasing orientation
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towards shareholder value are more consistently found in German firms that are
internationalising, whereas domestic and family-owned firms conform to more estab-
lished institutional and cultural determinants of  management behaviour (Carr, 2005).
These differences are significant because while they demonstrate pathway adjustment
in German firms they also indicate that the embeddedness of  component parts of  the
industrial relations system continue to provide some protection for workers against
emergent pressures. Pressures for system convergence (and below this, at firm level,
pressures for standardisation in production) are evident in sectors where German
firms compete with firms that originate in other nations. However, codetermination
and collective bargaining provide management in these firms with sufficient space for
strategic choice to protect not only themselves but also workers from some of  the
centralising tendencies of  multinational firms (Geppart 
 
et al.
 
, 2003; Williams and
Geppart, 2006).
This embracing of  new developments is a sign of  strength in a system and the
adoption of  a microeconomic approach to wages and working time suggests that
collective bargaining and codetermination are becoming a basis for differentiated
company-level negotiations. Opening clauses and opt-out agreements provide an
alternative to Merkel’s rhetoric of  labour market deregulation and reduced trade
union power and suggest that the Rhineland model continues to provide for social
cohesion wherein established stakeholders support the development of  enlightened
shareholder value.
 
2. Continuity and conservatism: the predominance of embedded stakeholder traditions?
 
While on the one hand the literature suggests an embedded system experiencing
pathway adjustment, another strand to the literature eschews this in favour of  a more
path-dependent course that stresses the imperative of  social cohesion. Since 1945,
codetermination and collective bargaining have during the period made a significant
contribution to coupling German corporate success with a period of  sustained polit-
ical stability helping to prevent both revolutionary tendencies in the workforce and
fascist attitudes among the business class. A significant danger of  decoupling eco-
nomic and, more significantly, financial success from measures to maintain political
and institutional stability is that the process may undermine social cohesion, an
endemic feature of  German society since 1945. The emergence of  a shareholder value
dimension within German firms and foreign multinationals could set this process in
motion and on this basis accommodative measures, such as opt-out clauses, working-
time pacts or the acceptance of  company-level bargaining within multinationals, need
to be resisted by trade unions, which are one of  the key actors committed to domestic
cohesion in the German business system (Fiss and Zacac, 2004). Trade unions do not
have to accept their decline or the need for structural accommodation on a social
partnership model but, alternatively, can shape their own environment and future by
continuing to promote embedded protection and representation strategies as part of
their renewal (Annesley, 2006; Frege and Kelly, 2003).
Frege (2005) addresses this point head-on by arguing that despite growing inter-
nationalisation, industrial relations research remains embedded in national research
traditions. This argument is not just academic; research on convergent industrial
relations practices in America, Britain and Germany does not demonstrate a conver-
gence of  practice within the three countries. In the main, this is the case because of
the different state traditions in each country. Thus, in Germany the presence of  the
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state and workplace democracy remains a dominant issue for research because of  its
embedded presence. So while shareholder capitalism and associated organisational
design-making and institutional control strategies may represent international best
practice, institutional actors within the German business system can use them as an
opportunity to forge renewal strategies. Similarly, German multinationals are charac-
terised as permissive in relation to established approaches to industrial relations
because of  this embeddedness. However, this permissiveness is less evident in subsid-
iary operations in more accommodating economies beyond Germany (Geppart 
 
et al.
 
,
2003; Geppart and Williams, 2006).
 
3. Outside in: shareholder value as a change management driver?
 
Much of  the literature on subsidiary operations in multinational firms examines the
degree to which local managers can use their position to wrestle concessions from the
centre, sometimes referred to as a host country effect (Ferner 
 
et al.
 
, 2004; Williams
and Geppart, 2006). At the same time, there is some evidence that, at least within
some strands of  German management, shareholder value principles are taking hold
(Carr, 2005). The difference of  opinion in the literature raises the question as to
whether German managers will continue to operate within the established framework
of  the German business system or begin to increasingly initiate choices to change the
system. Thus, if  a hybrid shareholder–stakeholder system is emerging, the tension that
it is likely to create within the management class is not yet evident.
Initially associated with the diffusion of  foreign, in the main American, multi-
nationals’ performance, management techniques (in particular the adoption of  vari-
able pay) demonstrate the degree to which German firms are adopting a shareholder
orientation. In addition, measures such as variable pay are also a proxy for the degree
to which German firms compete in more global markets. Comparative studies dem-
onstrate how the adoption of  these measures, among many others, illustrates that to
compete globally German firms must operate on the same performance and short-
term principles as American and British firms (Carr, 2005; Gulger 
 
et al.
 
, 2004).
Kurdlebusch (2002) argues that while this is the case, works councils and trade unions
remain centrally involved in the process demonstrating the embeddedness of  multina-
tional firms within the German business system. However, earlier contributions argue
that Anglo-American management techniques associated with short-termism and the
related increases in central control may threaten the established institutional frame-
work (Lane, 2000; 2001; O’Sullivan, 2000).
More recent survey and case-study material suggests that the diffusion of  share-
holder-value approaches in German management does have the potential to decouple
management remuneration and objectives from the more embedded collectivist stake-
holder tradition. For example, while adopting the rhetoric of  shareholder value man-
agement may fail to implement strategies that are associated with it and may in more
extreme cases actively lobby against the diffusion of  such approaches (Fiss and Zacac,
2004; Williams and Geppart, 2006). However, in low-skilled sectors which are more
internationalised and dominated by American firms, German managers may be less
able to resist such tendencies, via, for example, the use of  coercive comparisons (Royle,
2004). Despite this, evidence reform of  financial compliance and transparency regu-
lations for Germany’s largest firms and increased foreign share ownership are likely
to see German management increasingly rewarded with stock options, performance
and profit-related bonus schemes. While this trend is in motion, it may also be
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influential in garnering the support of  senior executives for three-year executive con-
tracts rather than five-year contracts currently preferred by German firms. Similarly,
performance management is clearly present, if  unresearched, in the Mittlestand sector
and its further diffusion to large firms would witness the system becoming more short-
termist and open up the possibility that management would choose to operate differ-
ently. Management careers may become more professionally and less vocationally
driven on the established model in the American and British business systems.
Overall, the literature suggests a variety of  responses to emergent pressures associ-
ated with shareholder value approaches and imperatives. For German firms, structural
reforms to financial reporting and associated measures of  competitiveness have ush-
ered in the imperative of  securing the support of  capital market actors, particularly
as management internationalise the operations of  a firm. However, the emergence of
management practices has been associated with managing for shareholder value (per-
formance management metrics, stock options and concentration on share price as an
index of  competitiveness); although it has weakened support for collective bargaining,
it has done so in a manner that is indicative of  its embeddedness within the German
business system.
Within a legally regulated system of  industrial relations, market dynamics, estab-
lished patterns of  state regulation and the coverage of  collective bargaining are, as
institutions, interwoven within the business system. So the emergence of  shareholder
dynamics, pressures for workplace reform and flexibility in collective bargaining have
to engage with the framework of  the statutory rules. Equally, within collective bar-
gaining while the system remains sector-driven in terms of  coverage, the negotiation
of  opening clauses and opt-out pacts may witness further decentralisation of  the
system. In respect of  codetermination, the position is more fluid: 18 of  Germany’s 25
 
Lande
 
 have codetermination agreements in place wherein employee representatives
hold a third of  the seats on company supervisory boards for large firms. While 60 per
cent of  German workers are not covered by the provisions of  codetermination, trade
unions see it as an essential component in dispute resolution whereas managers often
see codetermination (as at VW) impeding flexibility and change management (Clay-
don and Clark, 2006). A currently convened business trade union commission is
expected to call for a reduction in the number of  seats on company supervisory boards;
however, there has been no discussion of  any alteration in the distribution of  the seats
(Williamson, 2006). The important point is that if  collective bargaining is decentral-
ised, more issues may devolve from national-level bargaining to firm-level negotiation
under the auspices of  the works council. The interesting research question raised by
this possibility centres on the status of  collective bargaining as emergent framework
agreements are developed at workplace level.
 
CONCLUSION
 
As strong supporters of  the European project, German politicians and the vast
majority of  its business class have been at the forefront of  four economic, institu-
tional and social developments designed to further enhance European unity. First, a
pan-union single currency, the euro, was introduced in January 2002 (in Germany’s
case without popular endorsement in a referendum). Second, the related European
Central Bank assumed responsibility for the euro, but more particularly management
of  a eurozone-wide monetary policy was specifically designed to combat potential
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inflationary pressures. Third, and again directly related to the two previous points, a
eurozone-wide Stability and Growth Pact for fiscal and taxation prudence was
designed to compel ‘less disciplined’ Member States (Greece, Italy and Portugal were
often highlighted) to control public sector deficits at 3 per cent of  annual national
income. Last, an EU-wide political constitution that is beyond and including non-
Euroland states to secure improved decision making in the Commission and Euro-
pean Parliament.
The pace at which events have overtaken German enthusiasm for these components
of  Europeanisation is remarkable and, if  predicted five years ago, would have been
widely discounted. The transition from Deutschmark to euro was forecast to lead to
some frictional inflationary pressures which have turned out to be more structural in
form as fresh food and many other consumer items have increased significantly in
price. Second, the strictures of  the European Central Bank based in Frankfurt have
turned out to be both an economic and a political embarrassment to Germany and
France, each of  whom has consistently breached Stability and Growth Pact controls
over deficit financing. Neither France nor Germany has implemented the necessary
deflationary courses required to eliminate excessive deficit spending to the extent that
the requirement to control deficits appears 
 
de facto
 
 as merely a guideline. Third, the
rejection of  the EU’s political constitution by France and Holland has raised serious
political questions in Germany’s business class, the trade union movement and the
population at large about the loss of  stock value, the value of  incomes and the value
of  accumulated savings that has resulted from the transition to the euro and associated
fiscal and monetary centralisation.
More specifically, in respect of  industrial relations reform and reform of  managerial
practices in Germany, the failure of  centralised monetary policy and the manner in
which fiscal policy is neutralised by the Stability and Growth Pact has led to two
unsavoury but apparently effective constraints. First, a single currency–fixed exchange
rate system rules out any form of  managed float or competitive devaluation to stim-
ulate economic activity. Second, income taxation policy has in effect become central-
ised and therefore in large measure is unavailable to either boost reflation or control
inflation, and in Germany’s case is comparatively high in the first place because of  the
unification tax. To choke off  inflationary pressures associated with rising oil prices,
Merkel has hinted that it may be necessary to increase value-added tax rates.
Industrial relations reform and reform of  managerial practices can be seen as
necessary because each of  the constraints described above forces the burden of  eco-
nomic adjustment back onto the domestic economy and its institutional regulation.
Labour market flexibility in the form of  more decentralised collective bargaining and
reform of  codetermination rules appear as central mechanisms for adjustment. The
problem is compounded by the fact that Germany remains a powerhouse in manu-
factured goods, many of  which are exported, accounting for 40 per cent of  Germany’s
GDP, directly providing 9 million jobs. So while corporate profits are booming in
export sectors, workers within Germany are still being asked via opening clauses and
employment for competitiveness pacts to display flexibility on the Anglo-American
model. As outlined earlier, the obvious danger here is one of  decoupling of  social
cohesion between the successes of  corporate Germany and the broader German
economy and its domestic regulation.
Eurozone countries set monetary policy jointly via the European Central Bank and
this in turn dictates the parameters of  fiscal policy; yet policies on wages and working
conditions are determined nationally. German firms have sought to restore national
 © 2006 The Author(s)
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competitiveness through the moderation of  wage increases and greater worker flexi-
bility. In combination, these policies have not necessarily improved or restored
national competitiveness, but they have set two developments in train. First, the effect
of  German wage moderation and workplace reform is competitive, creating similar
pressures in other EU nations, especially in eurozone countries, a form of  competitive
adjustment reminiscent of  competitive devaluations in the 1930s. Second, many Ger-
man multinational firms are looking beyond the EU for markets and production
facilities. For example, EADS, the Franco-German aerospace group, has developed a
‘southern strategy’ in order to win contracts from the US defence department. Therein
the promise of  significant investment in high unemployment, low job states such as
Alabama, gains political leverage locally and brings with it significant economic
benefits in lower, non-union, labour costs. Each of  these developments is likely to
reinforce the pressures for domestic adjustment in the labour market, sometimes
termed competitive governance arrangements (Sisson, 2006: 46).
The VW case suggests that the German business system, and within that its pattern
of  industrial relations, has a strong imperative towards reform. However, the institu-
tional framework of  German industrial relations is so embedded that the movement
to Anglo-American shareholder capitalism, although in process, is evidently moving
towards a hybrid pattern of  enlightened shareholder value. Beyond this general con-
clusion, there are four further caveats which merit discussion. First, while the dominant
trend within industrial capitalism is one of  gradual deregulation from coordinated
market activity towards more liberally coordinated activity, clear convergence on the
Anglo-American model of  shareholder capitalism is not in evidence. The familiar
headline statements that status-based and resource-endowed employment is under-
mined in favour of  lower-road agency approaches to employment regulation are not
in evidence in the German system. Second, and directly related, the presence of
constitutionally framed legal norms combined with institutionally embedded cultural
and social norms deflect and obstruct the unfettered diffusion of  shareholder capitalism
in Germany. In an era when more measured historical evaluation has been abandoned
in favour of  terms like ‘embeddedness’, it is sobering to recognise both theoretically
and empirically how the past evolution of  a business system influences its future
development, suggesting that discussions of  shareholder capitalism or stakeholder
capitalism are themselves limited and determinist. Third, in relation to the German
business system and its attendant system of  industrial relations, the impact of  labour
rights and organised labour on labour management do exercise some influence over
capital and management in a manner that is absent in the UK or the USA where the
absence of  institutionally and socially legitimate legally enforceable participation has
confined criticism of  shareholder capitalism to activist and ethical investors or com-
panies seeking some measure of  corporate business responsibility. Last, the competitive
governance arrangements referred to previously represent German reaction to intra-
EU developments which are not the same as the emergence of  shareholder capitalism
or resistance to it. Hence, as a review of  the literature in part two demonstrates either
enthusiastically or reluctantly, a country-specific variant of  enlightened relational
shareholder capitalism is emerging in the German business system.
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